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_______________________________________________ 
 
This publication is a product of the South Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Sector Unit. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open 
access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions in Pakistan 
and around the world. Policy Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at Jnewman@worldbank.org. 
 
  
Abstract 
 
This paper complements the World Bank’s recent report on poverty by providing some 
additional information on inequality. In contrast to reports that analyze measures of 
inequality of income or wealth (such as the Gini), this paper focuses on equality of 
opportunities of children, where "opportunities" refer to access to basic services and goods 
(access to education, health conditions and basic infrastructure) that improve the likelihood 
of children to maximize their human potential. It introduces a new metric to Pakistan–the 
Human Opportunities Index (HOI) that combines the overall coverage rate of the 
opportunity with a “penalty” for the share of access to opportunities that are distributed in 
an unequal fashion. The Human Opportunity Index was developed recently at the World 
Bank and has been estimated now for over 20 countries in Latin America and Africa.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Policy Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage 
the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the 
findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry 
the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily 
represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World 
Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank 
or the governments they represent. 
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This paper was motivated by World Bank’s extensive support to the design of the new 
Framework for Economic Growth of Pakistan. These first two sections describing the HOI 
draws heavily on the description in the World Bank Report entitled, “Opportunities for 
Children in a Post-Conflict Country: the Case of Liberia”, prepared by Ana Abras, Jose 
Cuesta, Ambar Narayan and Alejandro Hoyos (Poverty Reduction & Equity, PREM 
Network).   
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Executive Summary 
 
1. This paper presents information on equality of children’s opportunities in Pakistan 
for two points in time (1998-99 and 2007-08) to illustrate the extent of progress over 
roughly a decade. A companion report analyzed trends over time in children’s opportunities 
at the national level and compared the situation in Pakistan to that of other countries. This 
report focuses on how children’s opportunities have evolved in the different provinces of 
Pakistan. The special emphasis on provinces is warranted as Pakistan is embarking on 
devolution of responsibilities to the provinces with the implementation of the 18th 
Amendment. While the results are presented only up to 2007-08, there will soon be data 
available for 2010-11 that could be analyzed in exactly the same fashion to provide an 
excellent baseline for the current status of the distribution of opportunities for children 
across provinces. The approach could then be used with future household surveys to monitor 
how equality of opportunities evolves over time and, importantly, whether any corrective 
actions need to be taken if greater inequality emerges as a problem. 
 
2. One of the strong features of the approach is that it allows one to identify what factors 
are important in explaining the inequality. Some interesting patterns are evident. For 
example, there is evidence that gender is no longer an important factor in explaining 
inequality in education in Punjab and Sindh. While there has been a noticeable reduction in 
the weight of gender in explaining inequality in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), it remains the 
most important factor.  
 
3. Some additional benefits would be expected from extending the work in different 
dimensions. One task is to consider additional opportunities or indicators for analysis. For 
example, it would be possible to define service quality standards—for the social sectors and 
infrastructure—and then determine how equitable the access to public services of a 
particular standard is. It would also be possible to deepen the analysis by drilling down to 
look at opportunities at the district level and analyzing whether differences in equality of 
opportunities are related to differential patterns of public expenditure or targeting of policy. 
Finally, the expected benefit of the approach could be enhanced if care is taken in the 
upcoming surveys to be carried out at the provincial and district levels to capture both the 
opportunities and circumstances that would be important to consider helping ensure greater 
equality of opportunity for all children in Pakistan. 
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Introduction 
 
4. To a large extent, the poverty and inequalities that one observes in Pakistan today are 
rooted in opportunities that were available to children when they were growing up. If poverty 
and inequality are to be reduced in the future, there must be greater equality in opportunities 
to children today. The idea that there should be equality in opportunities for children is a 
concept that is typically embraced by all—in contrast to the more contentious positions that 
are taken with respect to inequality of income or consumption. While some may be in favor 
of equalizing incomes or consumption, others may point out the negative effects this may 
have on individual incentives and economic growth. However, few would disagree with a 
guiding principle that there should be equality of opportunity—the "circumstances" a person 
is born into (e.g. gender, location, parental and economic background) should not determine 
the individual’s access to opportunities. 
  
5. While analyzing inequality of income or consumption can be done using measures 
such as the Gini, capturing the notion of equality of opportunity requires a different 
approach and a different metric. A large body of social science literature has been concerned 
with equality of opportunity for some time. Amartya Sen has been deeply influential in 
arguing for an equitable distribution of “capabilities,” which essentially amount to an 
individual’s ability and effort to convert resources into outcomes they have reason to enjoy. 
John Roemer’s (1998) work “Equality of Opportunity” was the first to formalize an equality 
of opportunity principle and remains the most relevant piece of academic literature 
underpinning the analysis described in this paper for Pakistan and other, similar work that 
the World Bank has been doing on the Equality of Opportunity in Latin America and Africa.1  
Roemer argues that policy should work to equalize opportunities independent of 
circumstances and that outcomes should depend only on effort. 
 
6. The World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report “Equity and Development” 
argues that inequality of opportunity, both within and among nations, results in wasted 
human potential and weakens prospects for overall prosperity. Conducting an analysis of 
inequality of opportunity, however, requires a measure or a set of measures that provide a 
practical way to track a country’s progress towards equalizing opportunities for all its 
citizens. To be useful to analysts and policymakers alike, such a measure must combine a few 
attractive properties: intuitive appeal, simplicity, practicality (especially in relatively data 
scarce environments) and sound microeconomic foundations to ensure that it has an 
interpretation that is consistent with its objective.  
 
7. Much of the empirical work in developing countries till recent times has focused 
mainly on measuring (and comparing) average rates of access to goods or services in health 
and education for the population and different subgroups within. What has been lacking for 
the most part is an intuitive and unified framework to address a range of questions across 
different types of opportunities, such as: How far away is a country from universalizing each 
type of opportunity? How unequally are available opportunities distributed across different 
sub-groups of the population? How important are circumstances to which an individual is 
born into in determining access to opportunities? Which are the circumstances that matter 
for access, and in that sense, contribute the most to inequality in access? What would it take, 
                                                          
1 For a discussion on different definitions of equal opportunities see Abras et al. (2011). 
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in terms of resources, to reduce inequality in opportunities, when providing universal access 
is clearly not possible in the near term?   
 
8. These questions have been especially relevant for Pakistan for quite some time.  
Many observers, both within and outside the country, have noted how poor social indicators 
have been in Pakistan and, historically, how poor has been the pace of change in the social 
indicators given its rate of GDP per capita growth over time. Easterly (2003) calls it “growth 
without development”. While Easterly noted that there had not been much progress in social 
indicators over the 1990s despite the expenditure and effort of the Social Action Program, 
the results for the decade of the 2000s appear to be better. Certainly, there has been a 
considerable push for expanding education, especially female education, and there is 
evidence of an increasing demand for education as evident from the growth in private 
schooling—even in rural areas.2 The question of what has happened to the equality of 
opportunities and what is likely to happen to opportunities in the future becomes 
increasingly important as the country begins to implement the 18th Amendment. One of the 
important motivations for the decentralization is to improve delivery of public services, by 
bringing the government closer to the people and increasing accountability. But there are 
also risks of exacerbating existing differences, as a result of differences in access to resources, 
management and implementation capability across provinces and a diminished role of the 
national government, which otherwise might be called on to carry out needed redistribution 
so as to equalize opportunities. As opportunities could become either more or less equally 
distributed, it will be important to track what actually happens over time. 
 
9. World Bank staff and external researchers in recent years have made significant 
progress in addressing questions such as above in a simple and intuitive framework, as 
demonstrated by Barros and Ferreira (2009). The report introduced a new metric, the 
Human Opportunity Index (HOI), which measures how far a society is from universal 
provision of basic services and goods, such as sanitation, clean water, education, and the 
extent to which those goods and services are unevenly distributed.3 A key feature of HOI is 
that it not only takes into account the overall coverage rates of these services, but also how 
equally the coverage is distributed—by measuring the extent to which those without coverage 
are concentrated in groups with particular circumstances (e.g. economic status, gender, 
parental education, ethnicity and so on), which are conditions a child is typically born into.  
 
10. The 2009 report computed HOI for five indicators: access to clean water, sanitation 
and electricity, completing sixth grade on time, and attending school from age 10 to 14. The 
analysis focused on children because unlike adults, children cannot be expected to make the 
efforts needed to access these goods and services, implying that these indicators can be 
considered as proxies for opportunities available to a child. The report, and the updated 
2010 version, “Do Our Children Have a Chance?” analyzed these five indicators for 19 Latin 
American Countries using the HOI measure, exploring both changes over time within 
countries and comparisons across countries. 
 
                                                          
2 See the discussion of educational actions and results in the Education for All: Mid Decade Assessment 
(Government of Pakistan, 2008). For documentation on the growth of private schools see Andrabi et al. (2006).  
3 This discussion draws from three sources: Barros and Ferreira (2009), Barros et al. (2010) and Molinas et al. 
(2010). 
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11. This paper introduces the use of the new metric of the HOI for Pakistan. It presents 
estimates at the provincial level of the HOI for a set of key opportunities, calculated from the 
1998-99 and 2007-08 Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) surveys.    
Besides simply tracking how the HOI for different opportunities have changed over time, the 
paper also analyzes what circumstances appear to be important in explaining the inequality 
of opportunities and how the relative weight of the different circumstances in explaining 
inequality has changed over time. The paper does not, however, go into the very important 
issue of how policies and programs might have influenced these trends. That type of analysis 
is best carried out by sectoral experts and lies beyond the scope of this paper. Such analyses 
could be useful complements to the type of work carried out in Economic and Sector Work 
by the World Bank and in studies conducted by other institutions and independent analysts. 
The paper concludes with some suggestions on how the use of HOI estimates might be 
employed to help monitor changes in equality of opportunities as Pakistan implements the 
18th Amendment. As suggested above, it will be important to monitor what happens to 
inequality of opportunities to allow for timely, corrective action to be taken if needed. 
 
Calculation and Interpretation of HOI 
 
12. The HOI provides an inequality-sensitive coverage rate of opportunities. An 
opportunity is defined to be a good or service that is sufficiently important for a child’s future 
welfare that society considers that it should be available to all children, regardless of their 
background. In most societies, basic education, health and infrastructure services would be 
considered opportunities. An opportunity is said to be distributed according to a principle of 
equality of opportunity if circumstances exogenous to the individual, such as birth place, 
gender, ethnicity, income and education level of the parents, have no bearing on how the 
opportunity is distributed in the population.   
 
13. The HOI is defined as the difference between two components:  
 
i. the overall coverage rate of the opportunity  (C) ; and 
ii. a “penalty” for the share of access to opportunities that are distributed in 
violation of the equality of opportunity principle (P). 
 
14. To get an intuitive understanding of how the HOI captures this penalty associated 
with outcomes that are distributed in violation of the equality of opportunity principle, it is 
useful to go through an example. Box 1 outlines a simple example of how HOI is measured, 
in a hypothetical situation with two countries with identical populations of children and 
average coverage rates of primary school enrollment. The example demonstrates how HOI is 
sensitive to inequality in coverage and how it would change in response to an increase in 
overall coverage or reallocation favoring the more disadvantaged group. 
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A Simple and Intuitive Example of HOI Box 1 
Consider two countries, A and B, each with a total population of 100 children. Each country has two 
groups of children, I and II, which consist of the top 50 per cent and bottom 50 per cent by per capita 
income, respectively. The coverage rate of school enrollment (or the average enrollment rate) for both 
countries is 0.6, i.e. 60 children attend school in each country. The table below shows the number of 
children going to school in each group for each country.  
 
Given the total coverage rate, the principle of equality of opportunity will hold true for each country if 
each of the two groups in each country has the same rate of coverage, i.e. if each group has 30 children 
going to school. But in reality Group II has 20 enrollments in country A and 25 in country B. This 
suggests that firstly, opportunities are unequally distributed, and secondly, inequality of opportunities 
is higher in country A. The D-index is the share of total enrollments that is “misallocated”, namely 
10/60 and 5/60 for A and B, respectively.  
 
Groups by circumstance (e.g. income) 
No. of children aged 6 to 
10 years enrolled in school 
Country A 
(100 
children) 
Country B 
(100 
children) 
Group I 
(top 50% by income)  
40 35 
Group II 
 (bottom 50% by income)  
20 25 
Total  60 60 
 
Therefore,  
HOIA = CA (1-DA) = 0.6 * (1-10/60) = 0.50 and 
PA = CA*DA = 0.6 * (10/60) = 0.10; 
 
 HOIB = CB (1-DB) = 0.6 * (1-5/60) = 0.55 and 
 PB = CB * DB = 0.6 * (5/60) = 0.05 
 
Thus even though both countries have equal coverage rates for enrollment, the higher inequality of 
opportunity in country A leads to the D-index being higher for A than for B, and HOI being higher for B 
than for A. It is also easy to see that HOI will increase in a country if: (i) the number of enrollments in 
each group increases equally (in proportionate or absolute terms); (ii) if enrollment for any group 
increases without decreasing the coverage rates of the other group; and, (iii) enrollment for Group II 
increases, keeping the total number of children enrolled unchanged (implying enrollment in Group I 
reduces by an equivalent amount). These three features relate to the “scale”, “Pareto improvement” 
and “redistribution” properties of HOI, respectively—properties that are intuitively appealing. 
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15. In this simple example with only one circumstance, the dissimilarity index and the 
penalty could be calculated by hand.  More generally, when there are multiple circumstances, 
this is not possible and the Dissimilarity Index must be calculated econometrically. Thus, 
more generally, the HOI is defined as: 
 
  HOI = C (1 - D) 
 
 Or, equivalently: 
 
  HOI = C - P 
 
 Where:     
 
  P = C*D 
 C is the average coverage 
 D is the Dissimilarity Index, formally defined as: 
 
 
 
 
The term 
ipˆ  is the predicted coverage rate of individual i. It is obtained from 
a logit model using the circumstances as independent variables.4 C is the 
average coverage rate in the population and is the weight. 
 
16. The HOI has a number of attractive features as an index. For example, the HOI is 
sensitive to: 
a. the overall coverage: when the coverage for all groups increases by factor k the 
HOI increases by the same factor; 
b. Pareto improvements: when the coverage for one group increases without 
decreasing the coverage rates of other groups, the HOI increases; and, 
c. redistribution of opportunities: when the coverage rate of a vulnerable group 
increases for a constant overall coverage rate there is decrease in inequality and 
an increase in the HOI. 
 
Selection of Opportunities and Circumstances for the Analysis 
 
17. Ideally, the selection of opportunities and circumstances to be monitored would 
reflect a consensus within the country of what opportunities should be considered universal 
and what circumstances are sufficiently important to identify to ensure that those who differ 
in circumstances do not differ in their access to opportunities. Since the objective of this 
paper is simply to introduce the possibility that the HOI approach could be useful in 
Pakistan, some common measures for opportunities and circumstances are selected that 
have been considered in other countries and for which data are available from household 
surveys in Pakistan.    
 
                                                          
4 The calculation of D from a logit model is described in more detail in Annex 1 


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1
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18. The analysis will make use of data from the 1998-99 and 2007-08 Pakistan Social 
and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Surveys. These two surveys were chosen 
because they provide observations over roughly a decade, which should be long enough to 
detect progress. Moreover, HOI calculations have been made for Latin America and Africa 
over a ten-year period, so this facilitates comparisons. Choosing the 1998-99 and 2007-08 
surveys also allows for the inclusion of real per-capita consumption as one of the 
circumstances to consider. Not all of the PSLM surveys have consumption data.5 
 
19. Other opportunities could and should be chosen. For example the selected 
opportunities capture only enrollments and completion rates. They do not capture 
dimensions of quality of school. If the educational system is willing to define a measure of 
what constitutes adequate quality, it would be possible to use the approach to determine the 
extent to which there is equality in achieving adequate quality schooling. Similarly, the 
measure of basic infrastructure only captures whether a child is at a home with a connection.  
It does not reflect whether there is electricity available 24 hours a day. But this is simply a 
question of availability of data. If the appropriate data were available, this approach could be 
used to capture the equality in the availability of service. 
 
20. A final point relates to the question of what is considered to be an opportunity.  
Should the government be content with simply providing a supply of the service and pay no 
attention to whether the parents take steps to make that service available to their children?   
This involves considering what it means to supply the service. A service may be “available” 
but the cost of accessing that may be prohibitive. If a society truly cares about children 
receiving equal opportunities, this may require going beyond asking whether a service is 
provided to a particular quality standard to a question of what is happening to the utilization 
of that service. But both concepts can be important. Society may be interested in having 
equality in primary completion rates and may also want to know whether one of the reasons 
for why there is inequality in primary completion rates is because there is inequality (or 
appropriately compensatory investment) in the use of public funds. Looking at both aspects 
of the problem could be fruitful. Table 1 presents the opportunities considered in the analysis 
and Table 2 presents the circumstances used in the analysis at the provincial level. 
 
 
 
 Opportunities 
Education 1. Enrollment of children aged 6-10 
2. Enrollment of children aged 11-15 
3. Primary completion among children aged 15-19 
4. Secondary completion among children aged 20-24 
Health 1. Did not have diarrhea in the last 30 days for children less than 5 
2.  Ever received immunization 
3. Received full immunization according to a record in a health card or a self-response 
of the mother 
4. Received full immunization as recorded on a health card 
5. Received adequate prenatal care, defined as at least 3 prenatal care visits with the 
                                                          
5 While having a good combination of data for both opportunities and circumstances (including consumption) is 
the main reason for selecting the particular PSLM surveys, this sort of analysis could be done with any of the 
household surveys.  It could be interesting to do the analysis with the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) 
as they allow for greater disaggregation. A listing of the available household surveys in Pakistan is given in Annex 
2. 
Definition of Opportunities Used in the HOI Analysis for Pakistan Table 1 
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 Opportunities 
first one occurring before the fourth month of pregnancy 
6. Received any postnatal care within 6 weeks after birth 
7. Attended by some traditional or formal birth attendant (defined as  traditional birth 
attendant, trained dai, doctor, lady health visitor, lady health worker, nurse) 
8. Attended by formal birth attendant (defined as doctor, lady health visitor, lady health 
worker, nurse) 
9. Institutional birth (defined as being at a government or private hospital/clinic) 
Infrastructure 1. Having improved sanitation  (defined as improved if from flush to public sewage, 
flush to pit or pit latrine, unimproved if flush to open drain, raised latrine or no toilet) 
for children aged 0-16  
2. Having improved water (defined as improved if from pipe, hand pump, tube well or 
closed well, unimproved if from open well, pond, river, spring or other) for children 
aged 0-16 
3. Having an electricity connection for children aged 0-16 
4. Having a gas connection for children aged 0-16 
5. Having a telephone connection for children aged 0-16 
 
 
 
 Circumstances 
Provincial Estimates 
 
1. Punjab 
2. Sindh 
a. Karachi
6
 
b. Other Sindh 
3. KP 
Balochistan 
1. Gender
7
 
2. Urban 
3. Household size 
4. Real Per Capita Consumption 
5. Highest Education Level of 
Household Head 
6. Gender of Household Head 
 
 
1. Gender 
2. Urban 
3. Household size 
4. Real Per Capita 
Consumption 
5. Highest Education Level 
of Household Head 
 
 
 
HOI Results at Provincial Level 
 
21. The implementation of the 18th Amendment in Pakistan ushers in a new era in the 
political and economic life of the provinces. While there are hopes that the increased 
devolution of services will lead to improved delivery and enhanced welfare, there is also a 
risk that the opportunities available for citizens (and children) in different provinces will 
begin to diverge more than they have to date because of differences in management skills 
and resources. It will be important to monitor what happens in the near future so that some 
potential corrective actions might be taken. The experience over the recent past can provide 
a useful baseline for that monitoring system. For this reason, the paper presents all of the key 
opportunities introduced in the earlier sections in separate tables, showing the results for 
Pakistan and the four provinces. Because the results for Sindh are heavily influenced by the 
results for the very large metropolis of Karachi (which are quite different), the results are 
presented for all of Sindh, for Karachi and for Other (non-Karachi) areas of Sindh. 
 
 
                                                          
6  For Karachi estimates the urban circumstance was dropped because all of Karachi is urban 
7 Note: for estimates of Prenatal care, Traditional of Formal Birth Attendant, Formal Birth Attendant, 
Institutional Births and Postnatal Care, there was not separate information available on gender so it was not 
included as a circumstance in that case.   
List of Circumstances Used in HOI Analysis at Provincial Level Table 2 
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HOI Results in Education  
 
22. Figures 1 to 4 present Coverage, HOI and Penalties for Primary School Enrollment 
for those aged 6 to 10, Secondary School Enrollment for those aged 11 to 15, Primary School 
Completion for those aged 15 to 19 and Secondary School Completion for those aged 20 to 
24. There are several points worth noting: across virtually all provinces, there appears to 
have been greater improvement in equality of opportunities in primary education than in 
secondary education.  
 
23. Turning to individual provinces, it is encouraging to note the improvement in both 
the coverage and equality in primary school enrollment and completion in KP and in Punjab. 
While Balochistan shows some improvement, it is lower than other provinces, which is 
worrisome given that its initial position was behind other provinces. For example, KP’s 
secondary school enrollment HOI went from 40.7 to 54.6, while that of Balochistan only 
increased from 35.5 to 40.8. In Karachi, there is some evidence that inequality is lower than 
in other parts of Sindh and other provinces—this is good news. The bad news is that Karachi 
shows only a relatively small improvement in primary school enrollment, but a stagnation or 
deterioration (in case of primary school completion) in other educational outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
Note:  For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level.  95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary School Enrollment (Ages 6 to 10): Coverage Rates, HOI & Penalty Figure 1 
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Note:  For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level.  95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
Note:  For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level.  95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondary School Enrollment (Ages 11 to 15): Coverage Rates, HOI & Penalty Figure 2 
Finished Primary (Ages 15 to 19): Coverage Rates, HOI & Penalty Figure 3 
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Note:  For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level.  95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
Relative contribution of different circumstances in determining the penalty in 
Education 
 
24. While it is useful to know the relative size of the penalty and to track how it changes 
over time, it is also useful to try to go behind the aggregate penalty and get some idea of what 
determines the size of the penalty. It is possible to do this using a Shapley decomposition, 
which is described in Annex 1. 
 
25. Figures 5-8 present the results of Shapley decomposition of the penalty first for the 
national level results and then separately for the four provinces and Karachi and other parts 
of Sindh. In each figure, the decomposition is done for two periods, 1998-99 and 2007-08 
allowing identification of any shift in the factors explaining inequality of opportunity over 
the decade. It is important to note that only when the change is statistically significant are 
results for both years presented. As it is still of interest to view the contribution of the 
circumstance to the penalty even when the change is not significant, the decomposition is 
presented for the latest available year (2007-08). In all figures, the position of the circles 
indicates the relative contribution of the circumstance to explaining the penalty; the size of 
the circle provides information on the size of the penalty; and the color of the circle provides 
information on the value of the HOI. Thus, in a figure, one can observe most of what one 
would like to know about what is happening to the equality of opportunities. The scale for 
the size of the penalty and the value of the HOI is kept the same across all opportunities in 
education, health and infrastructure to facilitate comparisons. 
 
26. There are two striking features that can be noted from a perusal of different figures.  
First, in most provinces the educational level of the head of household appears to be the 
major factor explaining inequality of opportunities. This is not the case in other countries, 
where income is often the most important factor. It would be interesting to see how the 
Finished Secondary (Ages 20 to 24): Coverage Rates, HOI & Penalty Figure 4 
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effects of having the education of the household head affect the dynamics of the expansion. 
This is not explored in this paper, but there is a possibility that having a critical mass of 
educated parents in a community may also encourage education of all kids. Certainly, the 
finding that income is relatively less important than the education of the parent might 
explain why Easterly (2003) had observed “growth without development.” If it was education 
of the parent rather than income that is the deciding factor, then it may take time before the 
expansion of education creates the demand. Simply having growth in incomes would not 
generate the increase in enrollments and completion rates.    
 
27. Second, there appears to be a declining importance of gender in explaining 
inequality. This reflects the success of efforts to promote female education. In Punjab and 
Sindh, the relative importance of gender in explaining observed inequality has diminished 
over time and is now not a very important determinant of inequality in opportunities. In 
Balochistan, gender is still one of the most important factors, but except for the effect on 
secondary enrollment, the relative effect of gender has gone down. The one exception to the 
pattern is in KP province, where gender discrimination is still the most important factor. But 
even in KP, while the relative importance in explaining inequality in enrollment has gone up, 
its relative importance in explaining primary and secondary completion has gone down.  
This would certainly merit some closer analysis in a subsequent sector-specific report. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School Enrollment (Ages 6 to 10): % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 5 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School Enrollment (Ages 11-15): % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 6 
Finished Primary (Ages 15-19): % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 7 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
HOI Results in Health 
 
28. This section presents similar comparisons across provinces for key health indicators.  
Figure 9 presents the per cent of children under 5 who did not suffer from diarrhea over the 
last 30 days at the national level, for the four provinces and Karachi and Other areas of 
Sindh. The most notable observation is the considerable improvement that took place in 
Karachi and that in the provinces at the national level, the penalties are quite small. This 
indicates that while there are between roughly 8 and 13 per cent of the children who suffer 
from diarrhea, there are not very systematic differences according to the circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
Note:  For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level.  95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
Finished Secondary (Ages 20-24): % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 8 
% of Children under 5 Who Did Not Suffer from Diarrhea over Last 30 Days Figure 9 
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29. Figures 10-12 present data for immunizations. While Figure 10 indicates that there 
are sizable improvements in whether a child is immunized at all, the improvements are even 
greater for achieving full immunization. The more than threefold increase in the rate of 
children who report full immunization and report having a health card in Other Sindh and 
Balochistan is particularly encouraging, because it suggests a greater presence of the formal 
health system. However, this improvement is over a very low base–less than 10 per cent–
and, as an absolute level, the rates in Other Sindh and Balochistan are still low. In terms of 
the change in the penalty, there are statistically significant improvements in equality in 
having any immunization (in all provinces and areas except for Karachi, which is not a 
problem since immunization rates were already high and the penalty was low). Particularly 
impressive was the gain in other areas of Sindh as almost all children under 5 received at 
least one immunization. When coverage approaches universality, the penalty must fall as it 
did in the case of Other Sindh. For full immunization–whether with or without a health 
card–there were no statistically significant changes in the penalty. 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any Immunization: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 10 
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Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
30. Figure 13 presents the Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties for adequate prenatal care, 
defined as having at least three visits with the first visit occurring before the fourth month of 
pregnancy. In all provinces in Pakistan and even in the largest city Karachi, the per cent of 
women receiving adequate prenatal care in 1998-99 was dismal. Across all provinces there 
has been improvement, but not enough. For all but Karachi, the HOI is hovering around 20 
per cent. In Karachi the HOI is 43.6 per cent. This is clearly an area where Pakistan must do 
better. In contrast to the case with immunization, the improvement in coverage has been 
Full Immunization: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 11 
Full Immunization with Record: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 12 
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accompanied by a significant increase in inequality in Pakistan as a whole, in Punjab and in 
KP. 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
31. As can be deduced from Figures 14 and 15, except for Karachi, there is a very large 
proportion of traditional relative to formal skilled birth attendants in all of the provinces.8  
As with prenatal care, the proportions of formal skilled birth attendants in 1998-99 were 
very low, particularly in Balochistan with only 5.1 per cent coverage. The size of the penalty 
in 1998-99 was large relative to the coverage, indicating that formal birth attendants were 
not very equitably distributed. There was generally a sizable improvement between 1998-99 
and 2007-08, but the values are still low and, in some provinces, there was a statistically 
significant increase in inequality. 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
                                                          
8 As stated in Table 1 formal birth attendants are doctors, lady health visitors, lady health workers and nurses, 
while traditional birth attendants are trained dai and those classified in the survey as traditional birth attendants. 
Prenatal Care: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 13 
Attendance by Traditional / Formal Birth Attendant: Coverage Rates, HOI & Penalties Figure 14 
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Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
32. Finally, for institutional births and for having any post-natal care at all, there is a 
similar pattern–overall improvement across the board in all provinces, but Balochistan lags 
behind other provinces. There are relatively high penalties for institutional births, indicating 
that the coverage of institutional births has been inequitably distributed. While there has 
been improvement in coverage, for all cases except for Sindh, Karachi and Other Sindh, there 
has been a statistically significant increase in inequality. The penalties are somewhat lower 
for post-natal care, but for Pakistan as a whole, for Punjab and for Sindh, there has been an 
increase in inequality. 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
Formal Birth Attendant: Coverage Rates, HOI & Penalties Figure 15 
Institutional Births: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 16 
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Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
Relative Contribution of Different Circumstances in Determining the Penalty 
in Health 
 
33. As the penalty is very small for the per cent of children under five who did not suffer 
from diarrhea in the last 30 days, it is not worthwhile exploring what accounts for the size of 
the penalty in that case. Thus, we move directly to exploring the circumstances that account 
for the penalty in the case of immunization. 
 
34. While there are some slight variations across the provinces, generally the most 
important factor accounting for the inequality is the education of the household head. For 
the national level results for immunization at all, the education of the head is more 
important than the provincial dummy variables and the urban variable. For the provincial 
results, there are no dummy variables, but the education level of the head is generally more 
important than the urban dummy. This information, coupled with the observation that 
coverage rates are quite high for immunization at all, suggests that the problem of 
incomplete coverage is not a generalized problem, but rather one of ensuring adequate take-
up of the immunization among families at lower educational levels. For full immunization 
and especially for full immunization with a record, the gap between the education of the head 
and the other circumstances in accounting for the penalty is diminished, suggesting that 
some considerations of the supply–rather than the take-up of the supply are affecting the 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-Natal Care: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 17 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
Any Immunization for Children under 5: % of Penalty Explained by Factors Figure 18 
Full Immunization for Children under 5: % of Penalty Explained by Factors Figure 19 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
35. Figure 21 presents the per cent of penalty explained by different circumstances for 
adequate prenatal care. In this case, the urban dummy is often the important factor (cf. 
Pakistan as a whole, Sindh, Other Sindh). It is interesting to note that, over time, the 
importance of both urban and education of the head has diminished, while the role of per-
capita real expenditure has increased. This has occurred with an improvement in coverage 
and deterioration in equality between 1998-99 and 2007-08, suggesting that cost rather than 
availability or knowledge might be becoming more of a limiting factor.  
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
Full Immunization with Record for under 5: % of Penalty Explained by Factors Figure 20 
Adequate Prenatal Care: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 21 
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36. Except for the case of the penalty for improved water, the only time when the 
provincial dummies appear important in explaining the penalty is with the case of both 
traditional and formal skilled birth attendants and skilled birth attendants. The fact that the 
provinicial dummies are important in both cases suggests it is the results with formal skilled 
birth attendants that are driving the results for traditional and formal. This could reflect 
different cultural practices in different provinces or differences in the availability of formal 
health care workers across provinces. It is noteworthy that the size of the penalty is large 
relative to the coverage, suggesting that there is considerable inequality.   
 
37. Looking at the individual provincial results, there does not appear to be a single 
dominant pattern. In KP, education of the head is the most important factor and remained 
the most important factor across the two years, whereas in Balochistan, the importance of 
the education of the head fell. Drilling down into the provincial level policies and 
implementation could possibly explain some of this variation. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tradition & Formal Skilled Birth Attendant: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 22 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
38. Finally, for institutional births and post-natal care, the urban dummy and the real 
per-capita expenditure appear to be generally the most important circumstances explaining 
the penalty. This suggests that the availability of the supply (and possibly the price)–rather 
than acceptance of the notion (which might be influenced more by the education of the head) 
might be the limiting factors.   
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
Formal Skilled Birth Attendant: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 23 
Institutional Births: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 24 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
HOI Results in Infrastructure 
 
39. Figure 26 reveals that progress in children receiving improved sanitation is very 
uneven across provinces–probably exhibiting the greatest variation across provinces of any 
of the indicators considered in education, health and infrastructure. While there was very 
good progress in Punjab and KP, coverage actually fell in Sindh, Other Sindh and 
Balochistan. Considerable different results with regards to equality were observed. There was 
a statistically significant decrease in inequality (as indicated by the reduction in penalty) in 
Punjab and in Sindh (driven by the large improvement in Other Sindh). This improvement in 
equality kept the HOI for Other Sindh constant, despite the fall in coverage. At the same 
time, inequality increased in both KP and Balochistan–in KP in the presence of a large 
increase and in Balochistan in the presence of a small decline in coverage. It would appear 
very different policies were being pursued in the provinces.  
 
40. It is noteworthy that the results for sanitation are almost always considerably poorer 
than for water–with the exception of Balochistan in 1998-99. In Balochistan, both the 
coverage of water and sanitation were low and were fairly similar. In all other areas, the 
coverage for improved water was far better than the improvement for improved sanitation. 
 
41. As can be seen from Figure 27, coverage rates for water improved significantly 
(except in Punjab where it was already close to universal and in Karachi where it was also 
high). In areas where sanitation coverage did not move (Sindh, Other sindh and 
Balochistan), coverage in water did improve. At the national level, there was a statistically 
significant improvement in equality in access to improved water, as well as in Sindh, Other 
Sindh and KP. 
 
Any Post-Natal Care: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 25 
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Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Improved Sanitation: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 26 
Improved Water: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 27 
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42. Figure 28 illustrates that there has been good progress in access to electricity almost 
everywhere, but with relatively poorer results for Balochistan. However, this refers only to 
whether there is any electricity at all and not to how many hours it is available. As mentioned 
previously, Pakistan does suffer from brownouts and insufficient hours of availability. In all 
case (again, except for Balochistan), there was a significant improvement in equality as the 
expansion of coverage took place.   
 
43. It is noteworthy that the improvements in coverage in infrastructure tend to be more 
likely to be accompanied by an improvement in equality than was the case with the 
improvement of coverage with the health indicators. This may have something to do with a 
possibly greater role for household behavioral choice with the health indicators than for the 
infrastructure variables.   
 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
 
44. Figure 29 makes apparent that gas is the infrastructure indicator that, except for 
Karachi, has the lowest level of coverage and the highest extent of inequality. There is a 
tendency for coverage to increase, sizably in Punjab and less so in the other provinces. The 
increase in coverage has been accompanied by an increase in inequality. As will be seen when 
one examines the circumstances that affect the penalty, consumption of gas is largely an 
urban phenomenon. It is not a surprise that the greatest degree of inequality is with the gas 
indicator. Indeed, the results provide some measure of reassurance that the methodology can 
represent the results for gas as distinct from the other indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 28 
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Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
45. Finally, Figure 30 presents information on use of telephones. The questionnaire asks 
whether the household has a telephone connection, which would not have been a problem in 
collecting information in 1998-99, but could have been problematic in the data collection 
effort in 2007-08. It is possible that some respondents could have interpreted that having a 
land line might also include a cell phone line. Thus, while the results are presented for the 
sake of completeness, it is not entirely clear how they should be interpreted. Do the declines 
in coverage rates for telephones in Karachi and Other Sindh reflect a true decline or a 
substitution to greater use of cell phones? The 2010-11 survey should provide better 
indicators of the extent and nature of telecommunication connectivity within the country. 
 
 
 
Note: For the change in the indicator, the values are reported only if the change is significant at the 95% level. 95% 
Confidence Intervals are reported in Annex 3. 
 
Gas: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 29 
Telephones: Coverage Rates, HOI and Penalties Figure 30 
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Relative contribution of different circumstances in determining the penalty in 
Infrastructure 
 
46. Figure 31 indicates that, at the national level, the three most important circumstances 
affecting access to improved sanitation are the urban dummy, education of the head and real 
per-capita expenditure. Part of the urban effect largely reflects the near universality of 
sanitation in Karachi, relative to quite low levels in other domains. The decomposition for 
the penalty is presented, but the value of penalty is very low, almost inconsequential.  
Beyond the effect caused by the different results for Karachi, only in Punjab is the urban 
effect the most important factor. In the Other Sindh, KP and Balochistan, the education of 
the head is the more important factor, with the effect relatively stronger in the later period. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
47. In explaining the penalty for water, Figure 32 indicates that the provincial dummies 
are the most important at the national level. As mentioned earlier, it is rare for provincial 
dummies to be the most important circumstances. Only for formal skilled birth attendants 
was the same case. This pattern, combined with the importance of the urban dummy in 
Other Sindh and Balochistan, suggests that the availability of supply was an important factor 
in explaining the inequality. 
 
48. Figure 33 for electricity indicates that, except for KP, the improvement in coverage 
and reduction in inequality that occurred in electricity was associated with a lower weight of 
the urban dummy in explaining the inequality. Figure 34 for gas provides the clearest and 
most understandable message of all the exercises. It clearly shows for all provinces that the 
most important factor explaining the inequality in gas connections is, by far, the urban 
dummy. This is exactly what one would expect, given that gas connections through pipes are 
only economically viable in urban settings. Still, it is reassuring that the empirical approach 
Improved Sanitation: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 31 
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is able to capture this reality. Given the difficulties in interpreting the results for telephones, 
no figure is presented for the percent of penalty explained by different circumstances for 
telephones. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
Improved Water: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 32 
Electrcity: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 33 
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Note: Results for both years are presented only when the change in the penalty is significant. If not significant, the 
decomposition is presented only for the most recent year. 
 
 
Summary of Results for all Indicators and Provinces 
 
49. This paper has gone systematically through each one of the key indicators in 
education, health and infrastructure at the provincial level. It is also useful to take a step 
back and see the big picture of how the HOI and penalties vary across all indicators and all 
provinces. That is provided by Figures 35 and 36. They do not present any new information 
over what has already been presented in the previous figures. However, by presenting all of 
the indicators together for all provinces, it is readily apparent that the HOI for health 
indicators related to births (antenatal care, institutional births, having formal birth 
attendants and post natal care) are quite a bit worse than other indicators (except in 
Karachi). The areas of greatest inequality are in gas, access to improved sanitation, 
secondary enrollment and finished primary and secondary school.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gas: % of Penalty Explained by Different Factors Figure 34 
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Relative Size of all HOI Indicators and Provinces Figure 35 
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Relative Size of all Penalty for All Indicators and Provinces Figure 36 
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Conclusion 
 
50. This paper has introduced to Pakistan a new metric for measuring equality of 
opportunities in several dimensions of education, health and infrastructure. While the paper 
selected opportunities that could be readily calculated from the existing PSLM, the approach 
is capable of being used on a variety of opportunities and indicators that could be important 
for policy makers. For example, one could define adequacy of test scores by specifying a 
specific threshold and, by identifying specific circumstances–gender, location, etc.—one 
could determine how close the country is approaching a goal of having equality opportunity 
in a measure of the quality of education, not just physical coverage. Similarly, one could 
define access to electricity by an acceptable number of hours of availability, not just whether 
a family has a connection. Then, one could carry out the same type of analysis that was 
carried out in this paper. 
 
51. This suggests that the Human Opportunity Index approach would be an ideal 
approach to monitor what happens to equality of opportunities as the country begins to 
implement the 18th Amendment. There is some concern within the country that there could 
be a risk of greater inequality as the provinces begin to operate with more autonomy and 
with different levels of investment in social sectors. Several observers have stressed the 
importance of monitoring what happens to social outcomes and the use of HOI would seem 
to be an ideal metric, given the concerns. It would be important for monitoring to be carried 
out by the government, rather than the World Bank. One possible institution to carry out the 
analysis might be a technical secretariat of the Council of Common Interests or the Planning 
Commission. It is also possible for the Provincial Governments to track their own HOIs, but 
given the concern about overall equity in the country, it would be useful to have some 
oversight taking place at the national level. The HOI is relatively simple to estimate from 
survey data and the World Bank has prepared canned programs to carry out the analysis 
which can be shared with government. 
 
52.  Besides the task of monitoring, it would be useful for the government to begin to 
consider instruments that could be used to bring about greater equality of opportunities if 
the monitoring indicates that a problem is emerging. As the provinces will have considerable 
autonomy, it is likely that the national government would have to consider instruments that 
provide incentives for the provincial governments to make investments that would bring 
about greater equality of opportunities. A natural instrument to consider would be matching 
grants. Provincial government might be induced to leverage their funds with matching 
federal funds, with the matching rate set so as to create incentives. For example, provinces 
might have to put in only 20 per cent of the cost for investments in nutrition if it is felt that 
there is underinvestment in the provincial governments in nutrition and that this is 
contributing to greater inequality of opportunities. 
 
53. It would also be possible to create an incentive for results by providing a rebate on 
the amount of matching funds that the provincial government provides–as long as the 
province delivers results. The HOI, itself, could be used as a metric to measure results, with 
the rebate of the matching grant dependent on the improvement in the HOI. This could be 
an effective metric as, being a calculated measure from a household survey, it is difficult to 
manipulate. 
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Annex 19 
 
Computing the Human Opportunity Index from Household Survey Data 
 
In order to construct the HOI, we need to obtain the conditional probabilities of access to 
opportunities for each child based on their circumstances. In order to do so, one can estimate 
a logistic model, linear in the parameters β, where the event I corresponds to accessing the 
opportunity (e.g. access to clean water), and x the set of circumstances, (e.g. gender of the 
child, education and gender of the head of the household, etc).10 We fit the logistic regression 
using survey data: 
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where xk denotes the row vector of variables representing the k-dimension of circumstances, 
hence, ),...,( 1 mxxx   and ),...,( 1 m   a corresponding column vector of parameters. From 
the estimation of this logistic regression one obtains estimates of the parameters  k  to be 
denoted by  nk,ˆ  where n denotes the sample size.  
 
Given the estimated coefficients, one can obtain for each individual in the sample his/her 
predicted probability of access to the opportunity in consideration: 
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Finally, compute the overall coverage rate, C, the D-Index, the penalty, P, and the HOI using 
the predicted probability pˆ and sampling weights, w: 
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9 This is reproduced from the World Bank Report entitled, “Opportunities for Children in a Post-Conflict Country: 
the Case of Liberia”, prepared by Ana Abras, Jose Cuesta, Ambar Narayan and Alejandro Hoyos (Poverty 
Reduction & Equity, PREM Network).   
10 Because the value of the HOI depends upon the circumstances chosen, there is not a unique HOI since there is 
no fixed set of circumstances. As the number of included circumstances is increased, the HOI can only decrease in 
value. Thus, the computed HOI can always be interpreted as an upper bound of the HOI, subject to the addition 
of more circumstances. 
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Shapley Decomposition: identifying how each circumstance “contributes” to 
inequality11 
 
Following Barros et al. (2009) we can measure inequality of opportunities by the penalty (P) 
or by the dissimilarity index (D), as defined in expressions (1) and (3) above. The value of 
these two measures–where P is just a scalar transformation of D–is dependent on the set of 
circumstances considered. Moreover, they have the important property that adding more 
circumstances always increases the value of P and D. If we have two sets of circumstances A 
and B, and set A and B do not overlap, then   (   )     ( ); and alternatively,  (   )  
 ( ). The impact of adding a circumstance A is given by: 
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Where N is the set of all circumstances, which includes n circumstances in total; S is a subset 
of N that does not contain the particular circumstance A. D(S) is the dissimilarity index 
estimated with the set of circumstances S.  (     ) is the dissimilarity index calculated 
with set of circumstances S and the circumstance A.  
 
We can define the contribution of circumstance A to the dissimilarity index as: 
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11  The initial idea of carrying out a Shapley decomposition of the HOI is due to Javier Escobal, Ambar Narayan,  
Alejandro Hoyoos Suarez and Jaime Saavedra. It was first implemented in a background paper prepared for the 
WDR 2012 (2011) by Alejandro Hoyos Suarez and Ambar Narayan entitled “Inequality of opportunities among 
children: how much does gender matter?” 
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Annex 2   
 
Recent Household Surveys Conducted in Pakistan 
 
PSLM—FBS 
  
2004-05 Provincial as well as district level survey. In this round for provincial level  
  survey income data was not collected in detailed format as usually collected 
  in the consumption and income module of PSLM. 
 
2005-06  Provincial level including income and consumption module 
 
2006-07      District level 
 
2007-08      Provincial level including income and consumption module 
 
2008-09      District Level 
 
2009-10      No survey conducted however, as per schedule FBS was supposed to carry out 
  provincial level survey. 
 
2010-11      Provincial as well as district level surveys are being carried out. The field  
  operations will finish by end of June. The data are expected to be available by 
  end of the year. 
  
During first half of 2010 FBS carried out PSLM Panel survey covering 8000 households for 
the Jan-March and April-June quarters of 2007-08 PSLM. This Panel survey was carried out 
for the World Bank.  
  
Labor Force Survey (LFS)—FBS 
  
The LFS were carried out in the years 2003-04, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 
and 2009-10. 
  
Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS)—FBS  
  
The PDS were carried out during 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
  
MICS—Provincial Bureaus  
  
The MICS have been carried by provincial Bureaus of Statistics with the technical support of 
FBS and UNICEF. The first round of MICS was carried out during 2000-04 and the second 
round was conducted during 2007-09. All MICS are district based but provinces have 
conducted them in different periods. In the second round Punjab has carried out MICS at 
Tehsil level which is further down administrative level within a district. 
  
PDHS—NIPS  
  
PDHS was carried out by National Institute of Population Studies(NIPS) for 2006-07 with 
the technical support of FBS. 
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Education Census—FBS / Ministry of Education 
  
In 2005 FBS conducted the first ever Education Census in the entire country covering all 
types of educational institutions. The census was carried out on behalf of Ministry of 
Education. 
  
Pakistan Panel Household Survey—Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics (PIDE) 
  
PIDE has carried out a panel survey with the technical/financial support of the World 
Bank in sixteen districts of the country covering approximately 4,000 households. The first 
round was conducted in 2001, the second in 2004 and the last round was carried out in 
2010. This survey collected broad range of data on education, health, employment, 
agriculture & livestock, expenditure & consumption, migration, crises & shocks etc. This 
survey also collected data on anthropometrics variables.  
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Annex 3  
 
In all the following tables, the numbers are highlighted in red when the changes between 
1998-99 and 2007-08 are statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
Table A3.1  Education Indicators – Punjab 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Enrollment 
Aged 6-10 
Coverage 62.35 64.88 79.60 81.86 
HOI 54.18 57.19 73.56 76.49 
Penalty 7.38 8.47 5.18 6.23 
Enrollment 
Aged 11-15 
Coverage 52.49 55.21 66.82 69.54 
HOI 42.98 46.07 58.94 62.10 
Penalty 8.74 9.90 7.03 8.27 
Finished 
Primary Aged 
15-19 
Coverage 56.47 59.36 67.10 69.79 
HOI 46.77 50.14 58.01 61.24 
Penalty 8.86 10.07 8.21 9.42 
Finished 
Secondary Aged 
20-24 
Coverage 24.72 27.53 33.02 36.15 
HOI 16.09 18.71 23.73 26.78 
Penalty 8.09 9.34 8.61 10.06 
 
Table A3.2  Education Indicators – Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Enrollment 
Aged 6-10 
Coverage 47.28 50.12 62.64 65.69 
HOI 36.54 39.66 54.13 57.75 
Penalty 10.02 11.18 7.54 8.90 
Enrollment 
Aged 11-15 
Coverage 47.61 50.94 55.03 58.51 
HOI 36.99 40.63 44.73 48.77 
Penalty 9.75 11.18 9.27 10.77 
Finished 
Primary Aged 
15-19 
Coverage 58.13 61.54 60.83 64.29 
HOI 47.66 51.67 50.39 54.50 
Penalty 9.42 10.92 9.36 10.88 
Finished 
Secondary Aged 
20-24 
Coverage 33.33 37.13 38.59 42.58 
HOI 23.38 27.24 28.00 32.07 
Penalty 9.06 10.78 9.72 11.38 
 
Table A3.3  Education Indicators – Karachi 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Enrollment 
Aged 6-10 
Coverage 81.36 88.36 83.75 89.81 
HOI 74.83 84.12 79.25 87.07 
Penalty 3.64 7.13 2.30 4.94 
Enrollment 
Aged 11-15 
Coverage 74.39 82.54 75.06 82.66 
HOI 67.87 77.92 68.93 78.46 
Penalty 3.93 7.21 3.61 6.73 
Finished 
Primary Aged 
15-19 
Coverage 82.46 89.09 77.39 84.35 
HOI 76.79 85.69 70.49 79.67 
Penalty 2.89 6.18 4.09 7.49 
Finished 
Secondary Aged 
20-24 
Coverage 52.34 63.19 55.44 63.81 
HOI 44.89 57.07 45.27 54.99 
Penalty 4.63 8.95 7.75 11.23 
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Table A3.4  Education Indicators – Other Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Enrollment Aged 
6-10 
Coverage 42.23 45.25 56.48 59.90 
HOI 32.41 35.61 48.16 52.11 
Penalty 9.12 10.33 7.32 8.78 
Enrollment Aged 
11-15 
Coverage 41.71 45.24 47.86 51.63 
HOI 31.41 35.14 37.32 41.62 
Penalty 9.46 10.93 9.45 11.09 
Finished Primary 
Aged 15-19 
Coverage 51.68 55.41 53.86 57.68 
HOI 40.77 44.98 42.72 47.13 
Penalty 9.90 11.44 10.02 11.65 
Finished 
Secondary Aged 
20-24 
Coverage 28.12 31.84 29.64 33.77 
HOI 17.70 21.28 19.83 23.83 
Penalty 9.68 11.30 9.00 10.74 
 
Table A3.5  Education Indicators – KP 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Enrollment Aged 
6-10 
Coverage 52.15 55.85 72.93 75.99 
HOI 43.01 47.14 67.02 70.78 
Penalty 8.21 9.64 4.82 6.30 
Enrollment Aged 
11-15 
Coverage 49.26 53.23 62.15 65.73 
HOI 38.52 42.82 52.51 56.75 
Penalty 9.78 11.39 8.50 10.13 
Finished Primary 
Aged 15-19 
Coverage 47.82 51.95 58.45 62.31 
HOI 35.38 39.73 48.61 53.06 
Penalty 11.44 13.23 8.75 10.32 
Finished 
Secondary Aged 
20-24 
Coverage 23.50 27.97 28.61 32.81 
HOI 14.56 18.52 20.03 24.19 
Penalty 8.33 10.07 7.74 9.45 
 
 
Table A3.6  Education Indicators – Balochistan 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Enrollment Aged 
6-10 
Coverage 43.47 50.57 51.53 55.67 
HOI 34.92 42.01 44.43 49.13 
Penalty 7.23 9.88 6.03 7.62 
Enrollment Aged 
11-15 
Coverage 41.34 48.29 47.77 52.27 
HOI 32.11 38.80 38.43 43.17 
Penalty 8.13 10.59 8.32 10.12 
Finished Primary 
Aged 15-19 
Coverage 38.66 44.95 42.87 47.58 
HOI 27.30 33.10 33.48 38.54 
Penalty 10.64 12.57 8.43 9.99 
Finished 
Secondary Aged 
20-24 
Coverage 19.17 25.07 23.19 27.73 
HOI 11.11 15.97 13.52 17.85 
Penalty 7.53 9.62 8.81 10.74 
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Table A3.7 Health Indicators – Punjab 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No diarrhoea Coverage 86.17 88.02 87.39 89.68 
HOI 85.20 87.34 86.35 89.08 
Penalty .47 1.18 .37 1.27 
Immunized at all Coverage 85.29 87.21 94.72 95.94 
HOI 82.99 85.34 93.78 95.30 
Penalty 1.65 2.52 .54 1.05 
Full Immunization(self-
reported and with 
record) 
Coverage 51.27 58.28 74.38 80.49 
HOI 45.61 53.58 68.67 76.17 
Penalty 3.77 6.59 3.59 6.44 
Full Immunization 
(with record)  
Coverage 35.75 42.43 54.00 62.05 
HOI 30.18 37.33 48.52 56.91 
Penalty 3.95 6.72 3.58 7.04 
Adequate prenatal care Coverage 7.71 9.87 21.96 25.89 
HOI 5.73 7.76 17.64 21.28 
Penalty 1.56 2.52 3.60 5.33 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Traditional and formal) 
Coverage 90.73 92.94 93.46 95.95 
HOI 89.56 92.22 92.39 95.47 
Penalty .49 1.41 .29 1.26 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Formal) 
Coverage 16.80 19.59 39.47 43.65 
HOI 11.54 14.19 30.92 35.30 
Penalty 4.72 5.93 7.58 9.33 
Institutional birth Coverage 14.16 16.84 35.42 39.59 
HOI 9.87 12.38 27.51 31.78 
Penalty 3.75 5.00 7.02 8.70 
Any post-natal care Coverage 8.62 10.77 18.59 22.73 
HOI 5.92 7.85 14.08 17.81 
Penalty 2.32 3.30 3.85 5.58 
 
Table A3.8  Health Indicators – Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No diarrhoea Coverage 89.37 91.24 91.63 93.66 
HOI 88.46 90.70 90.48 92.98 
Penalty .26 1.19 .42 1.41 
Immunized at all Coverage 73.99 76.57 97.96 98.93 
HOI 67.48 70.70 97.12 98.52 
Penalty 5.65 6.74 .36 .89 
Full Immunization(self-
reported and with 
record) 
Coverage 36.06 43.46 64.41 72.48 
HOI 27.13 34.67 57.75 67.08 
Penalty 7.27 10.46 4.26 7.80 
Full Immunization 
(with record)  
Coverage 15.30 21.01 33.58 41.97 
HOI 8.45 13.16 26.27 35.09 
Penalty 5.79 8.91 5.20 8.98 
Adequate prenatal care Coverage 8.51 11.07 23.45 28.07 
HOI 4.29 5.92 18.28 22.60 
Penalty 3.89 5.47 4.28 6.36 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Traditional and formal) 
Coverage 67.12 71.07 85.11 88.94 
HOI 59.94 64.69 83.19 87.72 
Penalty 5.98 7.58 0.79 2.36 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Formal) 
Coverage 25.45 28.73 37.67 42.54 
HOI 14.57 17.39 28.51 35.59 
Penalty 10.23 11.98 7.85 10.26 
Institutional birth Coverage 23.37 26.68 38.68 43.36 
HOI 13.72 16.53 28.50 33.49 
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Table A3.8  Health Indicators – Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Penalty 9.01 10.78 8.94 11.11 
Any post-natal care Coverage 7.92 10.46 21.81 26.46 
HOI 4.74 6.70 16.28 20.79 
Penalty 2.75 4.20 4.50 6.70 
 
Table A3.9  Health Indicators – Karachi 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No diarrhoea Coverage 80.88 88.33 89.17 95.00 
HOI 78.68 87.31 87.47 94.38 
Penalty 0.1 3.33 .04 2.27 
Immunized at all Coverage 94.37 98.11 97.13 99.77 
HOI 91.68 97.20 95.49 99.69 
Penalty .70 2.90 -0.06 1.78 
Full Immunization(self-
reported and with 
record) 
Coverage 49.87 75.05 76.80 95.83 
HOI 40.88 69.47 73.54 95.82 
Penalty 2.50 12.07 -2.92 6.19 
Full Immunization 
(with record)  
Coverage 42.05 66.78 76.80 95.83 
HOI 29.72 59.16 73.54 95.82 
Penalty 4.64 15.10 -2.92 6.19 
Adequate prenatal care Coverage 24.51 38.00 40.62 55.85 
HOI 20.89 34.61 35.34 51.77 
Penalty 0.95 6.06 1.62 7.74 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Traditional and formal) 
Coverage 94.94 99.64 81.26 91.79 
HOI 93.30 99.66 76.41 90.05 
Penalty .18 1.81 .89 5.70 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Formal) 
Coverage 79.82 89.85 65.72 79.85 
HOI 72.80 86.42 61.88 78.02 
Penalty 2.89 7.60 .29 5.96 
Institutional birth Coverage 74.05 85.21 77.43 88.30 
HOI 67.64 81.49 68.53 83.30 
Penalty 2.38 7.74 4.22 9.68 
Any post-natal care Coverage 16.45 28.61 42.99 58.02 
HOI 12.72 24.61 35.96 52.38 
Penalty 1.17 6.56 3.11 9.56 
 
Table A3.10  Health Indicators – Other Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No diarrhoea Coverage 90.11 91.18 91.70 93.82 
HOI 89.65 91.73 90.54 93.02 
Penalty 0 .71 .52 1.45 
Immunized at all Coverage 71.08 73.95 97.93 98.95 
HOI 65.44 68.89 97.03 98.55 
Penalty 4.76 5.94 0.35 0.96 
Full Immunization(self-
reported and with 
record) 
Coverage 33.03 40.66 60.23 69.12 
HOI 24.71 32.52 53.84 64.12 
Penalty 6.62 9.85 4.07 7.32 
Full Immunization 
(with record)  
Coverage 10.86 16.13 23.47 32.19 
HOI 6.16 10.80 20.80 29.84 
Penalty 3.66 6.37 0.71 4.32 
Adequate prenatal care Coverage 5.88 8.11 18.89 23.40 
HOI 3.04 4.62 15.29 19.64 
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Table A3.10  Health Indicators – Other Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Penalty 2.47 3.87 2.79 4.56 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Traditional and formal) 
Coverage 63.23 67.62 85.12 89.15 
HOI 57.44 62.48 82.80 87.71 
Penalty 4.63 6.31 1.02 2.73 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Formal) 
Coverage 17.93 21.22 30.82 35.88 
HOI 11.03 13.88 24.38 29.76 
Penalty 6.24 8.01 5.23 7.35 
Institutional birth Coverage 16.30 19.55 29.29 34.83 
HOI 10.42 13.22 23.79 29.07 
Penalty 5.26 6.95 4.84 6.94 
Any post-natal care Coverage 6.27 8.65 16.42 21.02 
HOI 3.84 5.71 13.29 17.95 
Penalty 2.06 3.31 2.22 3.98 
 
Table A3.11  Health Indicators – KP 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No diarrhoea Coverage 83.63 86.37 87.15 89.82 
HOI 82.56 85.75 85.87 89.06 
Penalty .36 1.34 .49 1.55 
Immunized at all Coverage 74.74 78.21 91.68 93.72 
HOI 69.48 73.95 90.16 92.73 
Penalty 3.95 5.58 0.83 1.69 
Full Immunization(self-
reported and with 
record) 
Coverage 50.48 60.64 71.00 78.88 
HOI 44.82 56.64 64.73 74.69 
Penalty 2.81 6.84 3.53 6.93 
Full Immunization 
(with record)  
Coverage 34.66 44.83 46.32 55.90 
HOI 32.46 43.91 42.75 53.47 
Penalty 0.33 3.45 1.28 4.72 
Adequate prenatal care Coverage 5.28 7.93 22.56 27.45 
HOI 3.96 6.45 18.62 23.56 
Penalty 0.92 1.87 2.96 4.87 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Traditional and formal) 
Coverage 52.68 58.31 58.64 64.14 
HOI 48.62 55.16 55.50 61.81 
Penalty 2.52 4.68 1.68 3.78 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Formal) 
Coverage 15.12 18.93 28.11 33.24 
HOI 11.84 15.70 23.77 29.25 
Penalty 2.48 4.03 3.20 5.13 
Institutional birth Coverage 10.81 14.08 25.06 29.95 
HOI 8.29 11.53 20.67 25.79 
Penalty 1.89 3.17 3.44 5.11 
Any post-natal care Coverage 4.75 7.63 17.72 22.21 
HOI 3.40 5.93 14.70 19.15 
Penalty .96 2.08 2.18 3.90 
 
Table A3.12  Health Indicators – Balochistan 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No diarrhoea Coverage 87.50 92.56 90.15 93.04 
HOI 85.13 91.89 89.34 92.58 
Penalty 0.45 2.59 .17 1.12 
Immunized at all Coverage 64.49 72.63 87.13 90.68 
HOI 59.21 68.40 84.54 88.87 
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Table A3.12  Health Indicators – Balochistan 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
 1998-99 2007-08 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Penalty 2.93 6.57 1.54 2.85 
Full Immunization(self-
reported and with 
record) 
Coverage 24.72 44.35 53.88 65.69 
HOI 18.16 37.14 46.97 60.48 
Penalty 3.10 10.68 3.89 8.23 
Full Immunization 
(with record)  
Coverage 6.81 13.70 34.37 45.81 
HOI 3.97 10.55 30.61 43.00 
Penalty 1.91 4.07 0.98 5.59 
Adequate prenatal care Coverage 3.45 6.32 17.50 22.98 
HOI 2.22 4.60 14.35 19.94 
Penalty .91 2.04 1.99 4.18 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Traditional and formal) 
Coverage 59.90 69.07 55.48 62.36 
HOI 52.55 63.98 50.61 58.48 
Penalty 4.30 8.14 3.12 5.63 
Skilled Birth Attendant 
(Formal) 
Coverage 3.98 6.12 20.80 26.48 
HOI 1.65 3.18 15.85 21.66 
Penalty 2.08 3.19 3.71 6.05 
Institutional birth Coverage 3.18 5.25 15.70 20.77 
HOI 1.38 2.86 10.32 15.15 
Penalty 1.55 2.64 4.32 6.67 
Any post-natal care Coverage 3.44 5.53 8.04 12.54 
HOI 2.00 3.82 6.16 10.52 
Penalty 1.11 2.04 1.10 2.80 
 
Table A3.13  Infrastructure Indicators – Punjab 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Improved 
sanitation 
Coverage 38.30 39.56 58.61 60.15 
HOI 26.25 27.58 49.23 51.03 
Penalty 11.76 12.28 8.94 9.56 
Improved water Coverage 95.00 95.63 96.12 96.69 
HOI 93.96 94.75 95.76 96.41 
Penalty 0.83 1.09 0.21 0.43 
Electricity Coverage 74.64 75.96 91.56 92.42 
HOI 67.05 68.79 88.06 89.28 
Penalty 7.09 7.67 3.08 3.56 
Gas Coverage 14.17 14.96 27.18 28.79 
HOI 5.04 5.52 14.89 16.62 
Penalty 9.02 9.55 11.93 12.53 
Telephone Coverage 13.29 14.24 22.57 23.93 
HOI 8.12 8.97 16.40 17.62 
Penalty 4.97 5.46 5.95 6.54 
 
Table A3.14  Infrastructure Indicators – Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Improved 
sanitation 
Coverage 46.05 47.54 44.69 46.46 
HOI 32.72 34.31 35.81 37.73 
Penalty 12.94 13.63 8.39 9.23 
Improved water Coverage 72.87 74.46 87.74 89.15 
HOI 65.75 67.70 85.06 86.87 
Penalty 6.56 7.31 2.13 2.83 
Electricity Coverage 57.51 59.10 84.43 85.75 
HOI 46.02 47.92 77.29 79.20 
Penalty 10.98 11.69 6.50 7.19 
Gas Coverage 32.68 33.79 37.76 38.83 
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Table A3.14  Infrastructure Indicators – Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
HOI 15.12 15.92 18.89 19.87 
Penalty 17.41 18.03 18.63 19.20 
Telephone Coverage 23.54 24.97 10.91 12.05 
HOI 16.28 17.57 5.37 6.16 
Penalty 7.02 7.64 5.38 6.05 
 
Table A3.15  Infrastructure Indicators – Karachi 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Improved 
sanitation 
Coverage 97.59 99.07 98.99 100.0 
HOI 96.00 98.50 98.49 100.0 
Penalty 0.57 1.61 0.03 0.51 
Improved water Coverage 86.07 89.79 90.45 93.29 
HOI 83.73 88.19 88.59 91.96 
Penalty 1.12 2.82 1.10 2.09 
Electricity Coverage NA (100%)    
HOI     
Penalty     
Gas Coverage 88.67 91.91 94.41 96.47 
HOI 86.05 90.26 91.99 94.98 
Penalty 1.32 2.95 1.39 2.50 
Telephone Coverage 37.76 42.50 24.07 28.08 
HOI 26.37 31.36 15.54 19.29 
Penalty 10.40 12.13 7.66 9.67 
 
Table A3.16  Infrastructure Indicators – Other Sindh 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Improved 
sanitation 
Coverage 37.97 39.64 30.34 32.30 
HOI 27.79 29.45 27.58 29.60 
Penalty 9.80 10.58 2.32 3.14 
Improved water Coverage 70.59 72.32 86.75 88.33 
HOI 63.33 65.45 83.39 85.51 
Penalty 6.70 7.43 2.70 3.48 
Electricity Coverage 50.94 52.76 80.36 82.02 
HOI 41.99 44.01 73.15 75.39 
Penalty 8.46 9.24 6.54 7.31 
Gas Coverage 23.83 24.98 22.60 23.80 
HOI 9.71 10.51 9.68 10.71 
Penalty 13.94 14.64 12.67 13.33 
Telephone Coverage 21.06 22.52 7.15 8.13 
HOI 14.84 16.16 3.33 3.99 
Penalty 5.98 6.61 3.69 4.27 
 
Table A3.17  Infrastructure Indicators – KP 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Improved 
sanitation 
Coverage 22.93 24.64 57.86 59.86 
HOI 17.17 18.85 50.51 52.80 
Penalty 5.43 6.13 6.80 7.60 
Improved water Coverage 55.94 58.17 71.56 73.45 
HOI 49.00 51.64 66.60 68.92 
Penalty 6.30 7.18 4.37 5.12 
Electricity Coverage 75.92 77.96 93.16 94.19 
HOI 70.20 72.80 91.34 92.70 
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Table A3.17  Infrastructure Indicators – KP 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Penalty 5.03 5.86 1.41 1.91 
Gas Coverage 8.21 9.20 12.69 13.75 
HOI 3.61 4.55 5.84 6.90 
Penalty 4.38 4.86 6.60 7.09 
Telephone Coverage 12.76 13.95 19.24 20.75 
HOI 6.82 7.83 14.12 15.50 
Penalty 5.73 6.33 4.81 5.55 
 
Table A3.18  Infrastructure Indicators – Balochistan 
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Estimates in Figures Presented in Main Body 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Improved 
sanitation 
Coverage 36.55 41.37 35.59 38.11 
HOI 33.25 38.60 30.96 33.68 
Penalty 2.25 3.82 4.03 5.04 
Improved water Coverage 35.00 38.22 61.43 63.79 
HOI 29.19 32.81 53.19 56.02 
Penalty 5.30 5.92 7.59 8.42 
Electricity Coverage 51.36 55.89 65.44 67.74 
HOI 43.57 49.22 55.09 58.03 
Penalty 6.34 8.12 9.60 10.47 
Gas Coverage 10.27 11.92 16.81 18.21 
HOI 5.96 7.60 7.34 8.63 
Penalty 4.07 4.56 9.15 9.90 
Telephone Coverage 14.57 17.02 8.51 9.66 
HOI 9.40 11.42 3.91 4.64 
Penalty 4.98 5.79 4.44 5.18 
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